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SIMONE WElL ON GREECE'S DESIRE FOR THE
ULTIMATE BRIDGE TO GOD: THE PASSION
Helen E. Cullen

Simone Wei! believed that Greece's vocation was to build bridges between
God and man. This paper argues that, in light of Weil's "tradition of mystical
thought," the Christian vocation is an extension of the Greek. The search for
the perfect bridge in Homer, Sophocles and Plato comes to fruition in the
Passion of Christ. The Greek thinkers, especially Plato with his Perfectly Just
Man, already had implicit knowledge of the Passion's truth.

Weil held an exceptionally broad view of the spiritual part of human
beings. She argues in an essay called "The Romanesque Renaissance"! that
we can trace our "spiritual treasures" back to the various revelations had
by every country of pre-Roman antiquity. 2 Greece was one of the countries that had a revelation:
.. .it was the revelation of human misery, of God's transcendence, of
the infinite distance between God and man."
In this essay, I will develop Weil's complex view that the Passion of
Christ is the fulfilment of the Greek vocation: to bridge the distance
between God and man. As Weil says:
Haunted by this distance, Greece worked solely to bridge it. This is
what made her whole civilization ... .In the minds of the best of the
Greeks there dwelt the idea of mediation between God and man, of
mediation in the descending movement by which God seeks man.
This is the idea expressed in the notion of harmony, of proportion,
which is at the centre of all their thought, all their art, all their science,
and of their whole conception of life. When Rome began brandishing
her sword, Greece had only just started fulfilling her vocation as
builder of bridges:
Weil saw the whole Greek culture from Homer, Sophocles,
Pythagoras to Socrates and Plato as different manifestations of the desire
for the perfect bridge which finally came to fruition in the person of
Christ.
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The idea of mediation achieved full realization, the perfect bridge
was seen, divine Wisdom became visible, as Plato had hoped, to mortal eyes. Tn this way, the Greek vocation was perfected by becoming
the Christian vocation.'

A. Creek Epic Poetry and Tragedy: Human Misery and Mystical Love
Homer was, according to Weil, the first of the Greeks to express an understanding of, the infinite distance between God and man, of human affliction - human misery - through his study of necessity in its manifestation as force in the Iliad. He described how all who were subjected to the
"empire of might" take on the same coldness as that which dominates
them: a coldness equalled only by the bitterness in their hearts. Bitterness,
Weil claims, is the human cry in the face of a violence which is pitiless and
kills. Homer described how this cry turns into self-destruction and
destruction of the other. Weil comments on Homer's description of force's
domination of the human soul:
... the soul that is dominated by war cries out for deliverance; but
deliverance itself appears in tragic guise, in the form of extreme
destruction .... The soul, which is forced by the existence of an enemy,
to destroy that part of itself implanted by nature, believes it can only
cure itself by the destruction of the enemy, and at the same time the
death of beloved companions stimulates the desire to emulate them,
to fo]]ow their dark example: 6
Ah, to die at once, since without my help
My friends had to die. How far from home He
perished, and I was not there to defend him.
Now I depart to find the murderer of one so beloved:
Hector. I shall receive death at whatever moment
Zeus and all the other gods shall accomplish it?
According to Weil, Homer shows us that the despair which thrusts
towards death is the same despair that impels one to kill:
I know that my fate is to perish here.
Far from my loved mother and father;
but still Twill not stop till the Trojans
have their glut of war. S
The soul dominated by force no longer belongs to the human race.
Homer shows that, in war, both vanquished and victor are driven by the
same madness towards annihilation. And, both are determined to make
an object out of the other. The misery of such a condition afflicts both alike
so that the strong and the weak are shown to be equals as they are in truth.
The ravages of death afflict us all; Homer shows the human condition in its
nakedness. Weil argues that Homer's intention is to evoke sorrow for those
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human beings who are reduced to matter before death:
The cold brutality of the facts of war is in no way disguised just
because neither victors nor vanquished are either admired, despised
or hated .... the similes which make them appear. .. as beasts or
things ... cannot make us feel either admiration or disdain, but only
sorrow that men could be thus transformed."
Homer's genius was, Weil claims, to show that human beings dominated by the empire of force should be loved and not despised. She finds a
parallel between the Christian notion "love thy enemy" - weak or strong
- and the notion, expressed in the Iliad, that in the other we see an essential human weakness that we share. The misery of the human condition is
to be so distant from God. Our common human lot is to be subjected to
force in its many manifestations. Thus, we have to hate force but pity those
who had not the love to resist:
... this poem is a miraculous object. The bitterness of it is spent upon
the only true cause of bitterness: the subordination of the human soul
to might .... That subordination is the same for all mortals ... .No one in
the Iliad is spared, just as no one on earth escapes it. None of those
who succumb to it is for this reason despised .... Here the humiliation
of a soul that is subject to constraint is neither disguised .... neither is it
an object of disdain. More than one human being, wounded by the
degradation of affliction, is here held up to be admired. W
After demonstrating the horror of human degradation in all its artistic
beauty, Homer shows, by contrast, how miraculous are pure justice and
love. Expressions of pure love show the distance which separates those
degraded by force from those who are, with grace, able to love:
... this double ability of turning men to stone is essential to might, and
a soul placed in contact with it only escapes by a sort of miracle .... The
resulting whole would be a dismal monotony were there not, sprinkled here and there, luminous moments, brief and divine moments in
the souls of men. Tn such moments the soul which awakes ... awakes
pure and intact....ln that soul there is no room for ambiguous, troubled or conHicting emotions, courage and love fill it all."
Weil quotes Homer's descriptions of "pure love" by which men and
women were able to escape the dominion of force. Some examples are:
how the "tradition of hospitality" takes on one occasion precedence over
the "blindness of combat"; expressions of familial love; expressions of fraternal love; pure expressions of love and tenderness between a husband
and wife; "the most beautiful friendship, that between companions in combat"; and finally,
... the triumph, the purest love of all, the supreme grace of all wars, is
that friendship which mounts up to brim the hearts of mortal ene-
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mies. This quells the hunger to avenge the death of a son, of a
friend. 12
What makes Homer's Iliad one of the finest examples of Greek genius,
according to Wei!, is that he understands the sorrow of human misfortune.
All human beings - whether friend or foe - are seen to be equally precious and their degradatjon in the face of destiny to be a great sorrow.
Homer's insight is to show that "chance" has delivered millions of human
souls to the door of destiny "without preparation." He conveys how vast
and powerful the dominion of force is and how pitifully weak human
beings are in comparison. And yet, it is this very human weakness that
must be loved just because it is our common human lot. The strongest person or the weakest is shown to be nothing in the face of the force which
kills. The only thing dis6nguishing one person from another in such circumstances is that one may by grace consent to God's love whereas another may not. To recognize this fragility in the face of force and, to love it
because it is an expression of God's love is at the same tjme to renounce the
use of force oneself. Those who do not recognize that it is only grace
which enables them to escape the dominion of force deceive themselves in
thinking they are different from the afflicted .
... the understanding of human suffering is dependent upon justjce,
and love is its condition. Whoever does not know just how far necessity and a fickle fortune hold the human soul under their dominion
cannot treat as his equals, nor love as himself those who chance has
separated from him by an abyss. The diversity of limitations to which
men are subject creates the illusion that there are different species
among them which cannot communicate with one another. Only he
who knows the empire of might and knows how to respect it is capable of love and justice. l3
One way one shows respect for love and justice is by listening to reason
even in face of "the empire of might." But, as Homer shows, all thought
that it might be more reasonable to live and not seek revenge, to let it go,
falls "into the void." For example, Achilles once spoke the words of reason:
Nothing is worth life to me, not all the rumoured wealth of Illium,
that so prosperous city ...
For one may capture oxen and fat sleep
But a human life, once lost, is not to be recapturedY
Achilles, being a leader, could have adhered to the law of limitation by
restricting his people and the Greeks to a "moderate use of might./I This
would demand that Achilles appear weak; that he renounce using all his
strength. But Achilles does not have the insight to practise this virtue.
Such detachment from appearances requires a renunciation of desire
and force; a virtue Weil describes as equivalent to "a constant dignity in
weakness./I This is, in fact, the virtue the Greek Stoics perfected. Given
Weil's analysis, one could speculate that the Stoics had learned of this
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virtue from Homer and other Greek writers, such as Sophocles or
Aeschylus, who did not admire force, but showed it proper respect. They
understood that it took all of the human ingenuity and virtue possible not
to be ruled by necessity. Weil admired the Greeks for their study of the
mechanism of force and the difficulties involved in keeping a detached
view of its pull so that one could be open to a reasonable and just way.
Homer's genius in revealing the relation between force and human misery, and the human virtues, "justice and the love that is its condition," was
only the beginning of a whole culture of writers and artists who drew on
the same revelation. Weil finds in Sophocles' tragedies similar expressions of the contrary feelings of the bitterness of affliction and love which
thrives even in a void. Weil sees in Sophocles' tragedy, Electra the working
of this love which she calls the love of the mystic.
Weil analyses Electra's affliction and how it causes her undue pain and
degradation. She had lost her father, brother, and all that she had known
was taken over by strangers. She was most embittered by the loss of her
brother, Orestes, who she thought was dead. Electra's love for her brother
was the one thing that made it possible for her to live on. Weil describes
Electra's love as the love of the "dark night of the soul." Nothing could
replace this love as she held in horror all other goods. This is the kind of
love, love in the void, that waits for God. Weil interprets Orestes reappearance as God's answer to Electra's tears of sorrowful love:
... Orestes, who had taken her for a slave, recognizes her by her tears.
He informs her that the urn is empty. He reveals himself to her.
There is a double recognition. God recognizes the soul by its tears,
then makes Himself known to it.
Just when the soul is spent and has ceased to wait for God, when
the external affliction of the interior aridity forces it to believe that
God is not a reality, if then nevertheless the soul still loves, and holds
in horror those worldly riches which would take his place, then it is
God who comes to the soul, reveals Himself, speaks to it, touches it.
This is what St. John of the Cross names the dark night of the soul. 15
This juxtaposition of affliction and love was what made this tragedy a
description of the human condition in its most extreme form. The Greeks,
claims Weil, had the ability to see that affliction is the one human condition
that has God's love hidden in its depth. For that reason alone, affliction
deserves respect.
In Weil's view of Christianity she finds the same human virtues that
she finds in Greece. We can, she claims, better understand Christ's affliction and Christ's message if we see it from the point of view of a unique
truth which contains the same message throughout time. The message
concerns the one transcendent God. Out of love, God gave us the freedom
to choose to open ourselves to God's love/ grace or not. Our misery consists in our separation from God. To overcome this miserable human condition, we have to renounce all that separates us from God. The Greek
writers such as Homer, Sophocles, and Aeschylus show us how vast the
domain of force, which is the name given to all that separates us from God,
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really is. To renounce force in all of its manifestations and to love the
afflicted who are crushed by force is the way, according to Weil's interpretation of these Greek writers, to build a bridge to God. Weil claims that the
Greeks help us understand the true message of the Passion:
Is it not an extremely powerful thing to be able to say this to all unbelievers: without the haunting of the Passion, this Greek civilization,
from which you draw all of your thoughts without exception, would
never have existed? 16

B. Plato's Bridge to God: The Perfectly Just Man Foretells the Christ
In looking for an image of perfect justice, Plato applied the knowledge
which an awareness of the role of affliction gives us to an Image of the
Perfectly Just Man in the Republic. Weil analyses Plato's thought on the
Perfectly Just Man from two points of view: first, the Perfectly Just Man in
society, and secondly as Mediator between God as Spirit (One, Unity) and
human beings (two, duality).
Weil examines how the Perfectly Just Man mediates between appearance and reality through Plato's study of the soul's journey towards assimilation with God. It is at the third stage of the soul's progress toward God
that she locates "prestige" - the screen which must be pierced if the soul
is to continue on or not. At this third stage, the soul either does or does not
encounter "the beauty in laws and institutions." It is also at this stage one
encounters either the "morality of the Great Beast" or "supernatural morality." To help us to understand what an immense task it is to escape the
influence of the "morality of the Great Beast," Simone Weil uses Plato's
metaphor of the cave.
Weil argues that it is a mistake to think that the metaphor of the cave
relates to knowledge and that sight signifies the intellect. Rather, she
claims, the sun is the good and sight (which she calls the "eternal part of
the soul") is the faculty which can relate to the good. The things in the
cave are unreal because they cannot be objects of love. These "unreal
objects" are the things which please the Great Beast, a society which is
ruled by a morality that has no relation to love. Weil quotes Plato's familiar description of the sophistic moral teaching that takes its cue from what
the people want - without giving any attention to the good:
Call whatever pleases this animal good, and whatever displeases him
evil, and they have no other criterion. They call righteous and beautiful those things which are necessary, being incapable of seeing, or of
showing others, to what degree the essence of the necessary differs
from that of the good. (Republic VI, 493c)
Thus, Weil points out, all the things which bring social prestige are
believed to be beautiful and good even though they belong to the realm of
pure illusion. These are: " ... the desire of the lover.. .. The pleasures of eating and drinking .... Riches, power, advancement, decorations, honours of
every kind, reputation, recognition .... "lc The most notable is power

358

Faith and Philosophy

because as Weil says, ninety per cent of it is prestige. This is remarkable
because power "determines all in this world." Even though power is
largely an illusion, it succeeds in deluding those who have it on their side.
As Weil shows in her commentary on the Iliad, those who have the power
believe that it is more than prestige and this leads them to go to war. But,
at this point they go too far since war spares neither the weak nor the
strong - power and prestige are shown to be illusions when the victims
are at the point of death. Nevertheless, Weil reminds us of a conclusion
she had reached in Oppression and Liberty: "The supreme social value, or
rather the unique value, is prestige."18
Still using the metaphor of the cave, she claims that prestige is the shadow of the puppets which are reflected on the walls of the cave. The puppets, she thinks, are not intended to be real. They are artificial things; they
represent social institutions. Social institutions provide a collectivity with
conventional good as well as its shadow, prestige. Weil uses an example to
make this clear: the miser sees in gold the shadow of gold, prestige, and
desires gold for this reason. Social convention makes of gold a means of
exchange; in this sense, gold is a "purely conventional good." The conventional good has a certain reality because relative good takes whatever
reality it has from the Good. But the shadow of this good, prestige, has no
reality. It is an illusion. That is why Weil claims that "There is a great difference between illusion and convention."l'! Furthermore, in order to recognize this difference and the good of social conventions, one has to tum
away from prestige, the shadows of the cave. Only then can one recognize
that "In all human institutions the images of truths of a supernatural order
are to be found."oU
Weil thinks that even a bad social order must be obeyed and be the
object of charity because it still provides images of the truth of a supernatural order:
Obedience to the Great Beast which conforms to the good - that is
social virtue.
A Pharisee is someone who is virtuous out of obedience to the
Great Beast.
Charity can and should love in every country all that is a condition
of the spiritual development of individuals, that is to say, on the one
hand, social order, even if it is bad, as being less bad than disorder. ... "
Yet, there is a difference between those who obey the Great Beast as a
Pharisee and those who obey in spiritual nakedness as Christ did. The
first, remain consumed by the desire for prestige, whereas, the latter
renounce all prestige. It is the total renunciation of prestige which, according to Weil, makes Christ a Perfectly Just Man: "It is the absence of prestige, and not the physical suffering, which is the very essence of the
Passion."TI
Plato, says Weil, knew this and that is why he made the laws and social
institutions the intermediary between a legitimate leader, "a man stripped
bare," and the Great Beast in the Statesman. The laws and social institutions can mediate because, if they are legitimate, they provide an image of
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the supernatural order, that is, they constitute an equilibrium:
"Equilibrium is the submission of one order to another, the order which
transcends the first being present in it under the form of something infinitely small."23 Plato, she thinks, defined the laws and institutions as constituting this kind of equilibrium, which is a harmony in the Pythagorean
sense:
Laws and institutions constitute another equilibrium which is placed
as if at the intersection of virtue and natural necessity. But it is
impossible to make out exactly what Plato has in mind: whether it is
the city as a metaphor, as an enlarged image of the soul, as it is studied in the Republic, or a study of the harmony belonging to social relations, such as one finds in the Statesman. Anyway the Pythagorean
idea of harmony as the union of contraries, and the combination of
that which limits and of that which is limitless, most successively
dominate these three studies. 24
Now to return to our stages of the soul's progress towards assimilation
with God. If at the stage of making laws, one can see the images of the
truths of a supernatural order in the laws and social institutions, then,
according to Weil, one must be one of the elect few: "For all of us, save a
few of the elect, are consumed by desire for prestige."25
For the elect few, the laws and social institutions can be something of
beauty, something to love even if undue pain is inflicted on one by them as in the case of the Perfectly Just Man. This is indeed one of the stages of
the soul's progress and no doubt the most difficult stage. This is the stage
when the elect have to endure affliction. We need the elect because it is
only through them that a society can have access to the supernatural
morality. But we tend to completely ignore the elect or, as the Perfectly
Just Man, treat them like a common criminal. The only way the elect few
can appear here below is completely devoid of all prestige. 26 We, however,
are completely taken up with prestige. In fact, it is a mark of the human
condition that reality can only appear in this world completely veiled.
Thus, to encounter this reality, we must get beyond all appearances; the
only way is to renounce all social prestige.
The laws and social institutions are supposed to maintain an equilibrium of forces between authority and obedience: "A well ordered society
would be one where the State only had a negative action, comparable to
that of a rudder: a light pressure at the right moment to counteract the first
suggestion of any loss of equilibrium."27 But the laws and social institutions will not be perfectly just because "the model of justice for men is a
just man."28 Also, she points out that "Our world is the kingdom of necessity. The appearance of justice is of this world. Real justice is not of this
world."29
The Perfectly Just Man could only appear here completely devoid of his
reality - as Christ was deprived of His reality and treated like a common
criminal, a condemned criminal. This depiction of the Perfectly Just Man
in the Republic (361b-e) was, for Weil, a clear indication that Plato is referring to the divine incarnation:
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The passage concerning the perfectly just man demonstrates the idea
of divine incarnation more clearly than any other Creek text .... in
order that a man 'in no way differ from justice itself,' should be the
same in all respects as justice, 'divine Justice, from beyond the skies,
must descend upon earth.'30
Weil argues that Plato " ... refused to demonstrate that such a thing could
be possible." However, she thinks that his thoughts were of the divine
incarnation because, for him, the perfect has greater reality than the imperfect; thus, the model of perfection for relatively just men must be an actually existing perfectly just man. Without an earthly appearance in space and
time, the perfectly just man would remain an abstraction. Wei! thought
that Plato believed this appearance could happen and she quotes a passage
from the Timaeus: "divine Justice, from beyond the skies, must descend
upon the earth."31
Weil thinks that, in the Republic, Plato is making the claim that just men
can only assimilate with God by passing by way of the Perfectly Just Man.
She supports this claim by quoting a passage from the Tlzcatetus:
One must be careful to notice how Plato clearly affirms that justice in
itself is not a sufficient model. The model of justice for men is a just
man.
It is he, doubtless, who is also the divine and blessed ideal spoken of

in the Theatctus. When Plato speaks of assimilation with this
model, .... the word assimilation in Greek, and especially for such a
Pythagorean as Plato, is a geometrical term which refers to the identity of relationships, to proportion.... No proportion is possible between
man and God except by mediation. The divine model, the perfectly
just man, is the mediator between just men and God. 32
But, according to Weil, human beings are not innocent; the affliction of the
original sin is that we are faced with an incompatibility between appearance and reality. After the original sin, human beings can no longer come
face to face with reality. A veil now covers reality so that we get no more
than glimpses of it. Under these conditions, perfect justice had to appear
as perfect injustice in order to respect the necessity of appearance. The
Perfectly Just Man had to appear as completely unjust while being in reality thoroughly just.
Thus, the Perfectly Just Man must appear naked, without honour and
unrecognizable. Only in this way would His appearance contradict His
reality:
Take the just man, let us show him forth by our words. Simple and
generous, desiring, as Aeschylus says, not the appearance but the
reality of the good. Let us take away all appearance ... let him be
shown naked of all things except justice, ... that while committing no
injustice he may have the greatest reputation for injustice in order
that this may be a touchstone for his justice .... (Republic 361b )33
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In order for the human soul to progress towards assimilation with God
he or she must follow Christ's method of turning away from appearance
towards the reality hidden by the appearances. At each stage, the appearance is both the barrier and the way through. Weil's "method of attention"
involves facing the contradiction between appearance and reality and waiting for the mediation of Supernatural Love. Weil holds that "Insoluble contradictions have a supernatural solution." For the Perfectly Just Man to
appear here as a condemned criminal, naked and without the prestige that
the appearance of justice would give him is a contradiction. Weil points
out that it is absurd for the Perfectly Just Man to appear in a manner contradictory to that which He is to be a Model of. That is why, she thinks
the Passion is the supernatural solution to this insoluble contradiction.
Only the Love between the Father and the Son could solve this contradiction. People who possess grace can see this solution. All others are
weighed down by the contradiction. Even many of Christ's followers,
Weil points out, had doubts when, "as Plato would have him," he lost "all
appearance of justice."
We see that Weil has developed her method of attention through her
analysis of Plato's thought. Furthermore, she believes that Plato is carrying
on a long tradition of mystical thought which culminates in the "foretelling
of the Christ"
In short, only the penitent thief has seen justice as Plato conceived it,
naked and perfect, veiled beneath the appearance of the criminaL
Plato, in going so far as to suppose that the perfectly just is not recognized as just, even by the gods, had the premonition of the most
piercing words of the Gospel: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? 34
Weil points out that the reason for the Perfectly Just Man's suffering in
Plato differs from the Christian idea of redemption or the idea that Christ
came to suffer for us. But, "there is a bond between the two ideas." The
link, as we have seen, is that the appearance masks the reality. The appearance is false. So, although our desire, which Weil believes constitutes our
very being, may be desire for the good, it is only inclined toward evil until
conversion. Only true humility can pierce the screen of appearance and
move towards reality. This is why Christ is the key because he consented
to be reduced to nothing in order to assimilate with God: "The Father is the
creation of being, the Son is the renunciation of being ... Humility is the consent to this reduction."3s

C. Christ's Passion: the Cure for Our Duality
As I pointed out above, Simone Weil saw Plato's analysis of the Perfectly
Just Man to be his way of expressing his desire for Christ. Furthermore,
she thinks that Plato even saw that Christ's Mission on earth was to cure us
of our "original sin." Weil finds this analysis in the "Dissertation of
Aristophanes" in the Symposium where Aristophanes says that Love is the
only thing that Gill cure men of their misery. Weil takes Love to be refer-
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ring to the Love which mediates between man and God. Aristophanes
claims that Love is the only physician for man because it is only through
Love that the human being can overcome the affliction of duality. Christ
also compares His Mission to the work of a physician.
Weil believes that Aristophanes' dissertation is a myth about original
sin. Man was once a "complete being" and therefore much happier. But
he committed the sin of "pride" by desiring to be like God: this was the
original sin. Man wanted to have all the same powers as God. Zeus got
very angry and wanted to chastise man for overstepping his bounds. Weil
claims this is very similar to the story of Adam and Eve. However, in
Aristophanes' myth the point that human misery has to do with men and
women's duality and ultimately their separation from God is clearly stated. For originally, according to Aristophanes' story, the human being was
at once male and female. He or she was complete and had no need for the
other being both same and other at once. After the sin, Zeus chastised man
by cutting him in half; thus, human beings became man and woman. But
Weil claims that Zeus' choice to chastise man rather than completely
destroying man was an act of Love and a desire to be loved by man.
The quest is for Love because it is only Love which can re-unite the two
halves. Without Love, humans feel a lack and sense of insufficiency; consequently, we always desire Love and a reunion.
Love in us is therefore the feeling of our radical insufficiency in consequence of sin, and the desire coming from the sources of our being
to be reintegrated into the state of completion. 36
This myth is the story of the human condition - of our misery as being
in a state of duality while always desiring completion which was our state
before sin and what we should be:
Our vocation is unity. Our affliction is to be in a state of duality, an
affliction due to an original contamination of pride and injustice. 37
Weil argues that the use of the sexes is only meant to give us a "sensible
image" of our dualistic condition; therefore carnal union should not be
mistaken for a remedy to that condition. Human beings encounter duality
in all aspects of life and their goal in each case is to try to overcome it. But
we cannot since "duality which is our affliction" is the human condition.
We are divided from that which we love, that which we know, and that
which we act upon as subject is divided from object. Unity is when the
subject and object are the same. Only God is united in this way. Human
beings can only become united like this through an assimilation with God
which is accomplished through love of God ..
Any desire to escape from the state of duality is a sign of love in us.
However, it is very important to properly direct that desire. This is why
human beings need the model of the "perfectly just man" - the original
sin was an indication that man had lost sight of Justice and of the way to
achieve unity. Thus, Christ's Mission in healing the original sin is to show
us the way out of the affliction of duality. Weil claims that in the myth
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"Love is the physician" and in the Gospels, Christ is. Just as Love in the
myth was the "right physician" to cure us of our duality and be the
redemptive god, so Christ was "the right physician" to heal our duality, for
He came to earth to be our Redeemer.
Christ, claims Weil, in His extreme afflicted state on the Cross was separated from His Father by the greatest possible distance; thus, He was, at
this point, the example of absolute duality .
... God cuts in two the Soul of the World. This represents duality (in
the Hindu sense). 111e Cross is this duality. In order to find the One,
we have to exhaust duality, go to the very extreme of duality. This
means crucifixion."'
Christ, as Plato had foreseen, had to go the infinite distance to be the
model - to show man the way to escape their duality and be united with
God. To do this, Christ had to give up all, to renounce all that existence
entailed. Christ suffered in complete nakedness, completely without prestige. The beauty of the Passion can be seen through the parallel that can be
drawn between Christ's abnegation and God's renunciation in Creation.
To be a human being and to consent to not having any earthly power or
wealth, and ultimately consent not to exist; that is the supreme expression
of the folly of Love. It is this complete and absolute renunciation of all that
distinguishes Christ from the martyrs. Christ, unlike the martyrs, could
not fall back on the prestige that the appearance of justice gives. He was
deprived of all appearance. There was no joy, as there is for the martyrs, in
Christ's suffering, only extreme affliction.
The Passion is the harmony of the union of contraries. Weil claims that
such extreme suffering is the reality of the union of the contradictories of
man-God. Man cannot be united with God without death because any
union between God and man denotes a unity with God; therefore, no
longer being man. God in creating the Universe withdrew from it and man
and all other creatures were given existence by this abdication. This
allowed man to have "free will." Thus, any union between man and God
on earth would be a contradiction; it would mean a union of Being and notbeing. This means that God is not only Mediation Himself but also a mediation of Mediation. In other words, God, through His constant Love, is a
Mediation between Himself and His Creation. And through the Love of
His only Son, Christ, God mediates His original and constant Love. The
reason it is a mediation of Mediation is because the Son is given
autonomous Love by becoming a human Person. This is what Weil calls a
"spiritual quartering" which is passion. God first divides Himself from His
Creation. These are the first two parts of the quartering. Then, God divides
Himself again through His Son when His Son descends to earth and lives
the Passion. God could only do this out of pure Love for His creature:
The union of contradictories means a spiritual quartering. It is itself a
passion, and is impossible without extreme suffering.'"
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The reason God appeared on earth under the appearance of extreme
injustice was because the reality of the God-man union could only manifest itself as a union of contradictories: the reality of extreme justice combined with its exact opposite the appearance of extreme injustice. Weil
claims that the Passion bears witness to the fact that true contradiction
leads us to God:
The perfectly just man: the union of extreme justice with the appearance of extreme injustice. Christ did not simply suffer, he suffered a
penal form of suffering .... Extreme justice combined with the appearance of extreme injustice is an example of that contradiction which
leads to God. 40
Weil claims that although suffering itself has no significance, suffering
does point to what does have significance; it points to reality itself as long as
human beings don't lose sight of it because of the suffering. We must see
suffering as the necessary effect of the contradiction which makes up creation itself, i.e. the separation of God, the reality, from His creation, the
appearance. Christ gives us the perfect image, a Model through the crucifixion of the relation between extreme suffering and contradiction. If we
can see the reality behind the suffering, it can have redemptive value for us:
We must use suffering qua contradiction that has been experienced.
By using it in this way it acquires a mediatory, and consequently a
redemptive, value. We must use it qua spiritual quarteringY
The greatness of Christianity, seen from the Platonic perspective, is that
it saw suffering and affliction to be in keeping with God's order; thus, the

Greeks understood that human beings must not seek in God a remedy for
affliction or suffering rather they must use suffering to bring them closer to
Christ. This is, however, very difficult because, as Christ has shown us,
everyone, almost without exception, turns their back on the afflicted.
Furthermore, because they are human, the afflicted themselves begin to
hate and be disgusted by themselves. Weil claims that by the laws of sensibility human beings are repulsed and disgusted by the horror of being
reduced to the state of a thing. This is the worst possible state imaginable
for the human being. Thus, without even being conscious of it, we treat the
afflicted with disdain:
Men have the same carnal nature as animals. If a hen is hurt, the others rush upon it, attacking it with their beaks. This phenomenon is as
automatic as gravitation. Our senses attach all the scorn, all the revulsion, all the hatred which our reason attaches to crime, to affliction.
Except for those whose whole soul is inhabited by Christ, everybody
despises the afflicted to some extent, although practically no one is
conscious of it. 42
Christ, on the Cross, is the "perfect image" for the afflicted because they,
like Christ, are not criminals; and yet, they suffer a distance almost as great
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as the "infinite distance" which separated Christ on the Cross and God.
And, also like Christ, they are capable of loving God through this distance
because God created them to love. It is important, however, that they know
this. Weil confirms that God created out of love and for love. "He created
beings capable of love from all possible distances." This is why Christ went
the infinite distance in identifying with the thieves while on the cross. God
went the greatest possible distance, the infinite distance because no other
being could possibly do this. The crucifixion was an act of love; it was God
going the infinite distance. If God was prepared to go this distance, Weil
thought that the afflicted should consider themselves fortunate to be close to
reality, "at the foot of the cross."
CONCLUSION

Weil believed that it was Greece's vocation to build bridges between
God and man and showed how Homer's, Sophocles', and Plato's desire for
the "perfect bridge" came to fruition in the Passion of Christ.
Homer in the Iliad and Sophocles in Electra show us how vast the
domain of force is and suggest that the way to overcome this force and
build a bridge between us and God is to love the afflicted. Weil thinks
that, in doing so, these Greek writers have demonstrated that they had
implicit knowledge of the true message of the Passion.
Weil sees the whole of Plato's writings from the point of view of his Greek
vocation: to build a bridge to God. Plato's Perfectly Just Man (in the Republic
and the Theatetus) has the utmost respect for social order, but, disdains the
prestige which consumes those who obey the Great Beast. Both Plato's
Perfectly Just Man and Christ totally renounce prestige. Both appear on
earth as condemned criminals because the reality of justice has to appear
masked in this world, the kingdom of necessity. Plato's depiction of the
Perfectly Just Man thus foreshadows the divine incarnation. Plato shows us
the contradiction between the reality of the Perfectly Just Man and his
appearance as a common criminal. Christ solves Plato's contradiction by living the Passion.
Weil also finds in Plato's Symposium the view that "Love" is the "right
physician" for our duality. Christ used the same words to describe His
Mission on earth. He is this "Love" as He came to earth to cure us of our
original sin and its consequences: our affliction of duality. As our Redeemer,
Christ in His Passion traveled the greatest possible distance from the Father
whilst still maintaining His Love of His neighbor and God. The afflicted are
nearest to Christ in their suffering whether or not they maintain their love. If
they do continue to love, they show they have taken the way of the Cross.
Weil's view of the "Greek vocation" becoming the "Christian vocation"
extends the historical past of Christianity thus showing its "continuity in
time." By penetrating the Greek "tradition of mystical thought," she deepens our understanding of the contradictory nature of Christ's appearance
and increases our awe of the beauty of its culmination: the Passion.
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